771 and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of
798 the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the North China Region.

II. BUDDHISM

779 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just
798 noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot T'ai Hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered servere attrition.

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4. Article 88, Ch. III.

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798 Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of Buddhist establishments were converted to use as schools barracks, and police stations.[5]

The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated widespread anti-Buddhist sentiment throughout Free and Occupied China.

The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parasitic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained

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5. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin Magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

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largely negative.[6] Thus gradual extinction of the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time. But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy and establishments in the North China Region were still numerous.[7]

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6. Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to70 per cent made the choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine and deep faith; presented to the church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

7. Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook], 1933, p. T2.

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Provinces and major cities	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries, Nunneries
Hopei	2,100	1,170
Shansi	16,640	5,042
Peking	1,490	810

It has not been possible to trace the decline from 1930 onward, but the pressures of war and invasion added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of both clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930,[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to less than 100 in 1954.[10] Estimates[11] on the total number of clergy vary, but in 1931 they appear to have numbered 500,000 to 600,000.

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8. Ibid. Basis of figures is data collected by the China Buddhist Association.

9. Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on the China Mainland, (a four-page pamphlet), Buddhist Assciation of China, Taiwan, 1954; herinafter cited as Atrocities.

10. Ibid.

11. Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

779 Refugees in 1949-50 reported that four out of
798 every seven clerics had been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954, it has been estimated, there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

779 While the traditional clergy was in decline, Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. The leadership of this movement was largely from the East China Region. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: that an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the Red Swastika Society (modeled on the Red Cross), YMBA and YWBA patterned on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were organized. Buddhist writing

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12. Ibid., op. cit., pp. 90-91.
13. Artocities.

779 and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religon, continued as the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947, but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented Pan-Asians. The great abbot T'ai Hsü, master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective, and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive long-range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed, and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure. When the Communists came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers claimed in 1930 by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

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15. Shen-pao Yearbook, 1933, p. T2.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Hopei	12,120	28
Shansi	6,160	1

As these figures indicate, Buddhism in North China was far weaker than it was in the provinces of the Yangtze valley and further south.

779 668 Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived until 1949 have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists

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16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

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to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, the association will be used as a propaganda device to allay fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counter-revolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use

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18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsü Yün have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf. Buddhism in China, Foreword. The same volume shows the effort of the Communists to make Peking again a center of Lamaistic Buddhism which prevails in Tibet and Mongolia.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

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by the state. One source,[20] admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1. Certain Buddhist monuments of historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on nearby farms, in Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22]

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the

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20. Atrocities.

21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

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668 Buddha's birthday.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying out. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

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23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

24. The outstanding example is Chü Tsan, a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work, the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü Tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. Chü Tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

III. TAOISM

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Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scripture, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation

25. The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt with in the chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

771 of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life
•779 was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Teacher" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiang-si by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant. The Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

779 Religious Taoism has not had the inspira-
771 tion or the leadership to develop modern doctrines
668 and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communists will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "religious

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26. Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

27. Ibid., p. 152.

28. Shina mondai jiten, [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

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779 Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the
771 support of religious groups, they invited repre-
668 sentatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes
771 all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors has steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshiped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar,[30] One sample survey[31] showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for

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29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

30. Cf. Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

31. C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

779 their original purpose; the decline in the last
771 twenty-five years has been accelerated.

779 In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists
771 have moved to bring to an end a complex of an-
668 cient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer." At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Health Drive, and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

779 Another Taoist-linked institution is the
771 secret society. These organizations have
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32. Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [The Three-Character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

779 575 668 771 traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies, doctrines, and patron deities from religious and folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social and political functions: they provide, expecially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies

33. Cf. B. Favre, Les sociétés secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

779 575 668 771 and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That his claims of victory were premature is suggested by a recent report of the dissolution of five secret society organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to inflitrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance is discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

Secret societies have been particularly numerous in North China.

The Pai-lien Chiao (White Lotus Society) has a long history. It was founded some seven hundred years ago and was then a focus of Chinese resistance to the Mongol invaders. In 1794, 1801, and 1813 its members rebelled against the Manchu dynasty. The society's areas of strength in modern times have been the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. It has many branches, some of which will be considered separately below.[36]

The Hung-ch'iang Hui (Society of Redspears) an offshoot of the White Lotus Society, fought bandits, government troops, and warlord armies between 1916 and 1924. It was strong in Shansi,

34. NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

35. NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

36. Chan, op. cit., p. 158.

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Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei, but its center of strength has since shifted to the south and southwest.[37]

The Tsai-li Hui (Principle Abiding Society) is often regarded as a branch of the White Lotus Society. Despite frequent persecution, it has remained strong, particularly in Hopei, Shantung, and Honan. Its public halls were to be found all over the north, especially in Tientsin and Peking. It attracted artisans and laborers, some farmers and merchants, and a small number of intellectuals.[38]

The Ko-lao Hui (Society of Elders) is somewhat more religious than other societies and has a history of resistance to government controls. Founded in Fukien, it has had important strength in Central and West China and in the North. It is "the most extensive, well-organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[39]

The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) was founded soon after the revolution of 1911, but it grew most rapidly after 1928. It gained strength and extended its activities throughout North China during the period of Japanese occupation.[40] Its central office was probably

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37. Ibid., p. 159.
38. Ibid., pp. 156-57.
39. Ibid., pp. 160,-61.
40. Ibid., pp. 166-67. Willem Grootaers, "Une société secrète moderne, I-koan Tao, bibliographie annotée," Folklore Studies, Vol. V, 1946, pp. 316-52.

779 in Shantung, but its center of publication was in Tientsin. The society was under severe pressure from the Nationalist Government, which seized two of its local headquarters and dispersed its members.[41] Nevertheless, it has survived. A Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated that the society is still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

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IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, see the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Modammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have

41. Grootaers, op. cit., pp. 316, 351.
42. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

779 alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear white headdresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize: keeping inns and organizing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Imam, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes, interprets Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in Ara-

43. Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

44. Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

779 bic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

In the North China Region, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces. But the major centers, now recognized by the Communists as "autonomous areas," lie in the southwest, the northwest, and in Central Asia. The following table[45] of believers and religious establishments (probably mosques) gives some indication of their distribution in the two provinces of this region, as of 1938. However, the source of these figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars think is far too high.[46]

Province	Mosques	Adherents
Hopei	2,949	3,379,410
Shansi	1,931	1,589,570

45. Chung-hua Nien-chien [Chinese Year-book], 1948, pp. 126-27.

46. Cf. the admirable summary of the statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88. Chan, p. 188, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammedan scholar Pai Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Language Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

779 Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

As the Chinese Moslems came out of isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslems with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox

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47. Chan, op. cit., pp. 190-91.

•779 Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary ways developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874), and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[48]

Chinese Mohammedans in the course of the modernist movement, accepted the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic, and opened schools which taught general as well as religious subjects. And they began, like modernists of other faiths, to emphasize the compatibility between the Koran and modern science.[49] They published modern periodicals, of which there were nine in 1947; circulation, however, was small. In 1936 the first Chinese Moslem to be so honored received a degree from El Azhar University, the great center of Islamic learning in Cairo. By 1950 the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or coordinated two hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese

48. Ibid., pp. 192-94.
49. Ibid., p. 198.

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779 learning born of religious conservatism.[50]

779 What have been Chinese Communist policies
668 toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the North China Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted towards centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have much in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association, which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are

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50. Ibid., pp. 198-205.

51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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668 increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland." [53]

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52. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

53. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

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668 The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions" (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems[54] has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems." Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not understand Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little reliable information on the Islamic communities of North China today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the government, and the youth will tend in time to become more Com-

54. Chinese Moslems, introduction.

779 668 munist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit urban and rural communities in North China will probably proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth now classified as "workers",[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce initial suspicion and resist-

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55. A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students have received free or reduced tuition. SCMP, 1068, Jan. 14, 1955, p. 35.

56. NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955' SCMP, 1067, p 23. The claim is made that of the Moslems of Paoting, Hopei Province, the percentage of workers' families has risen from 14% to 33.3% in 1955.

57. SCMP, 1068, p. 35.

58. Ibid.

779 668 ance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of North China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large Islamic communities in the southwest and the northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in this area. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

779 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because of its foreign support and its allegiance to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits, speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The most

779 striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of world-wide policies in an age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[59]

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

This process of replacing foreign clergy with Chinese clergy has made greatest progress in the older Catholic areas, particularly in North China. There are 144 dioceses or apostolic prefectures, and 29 of these, in the major cultural and commercial centers, are administered by Chinese prelates.[60] The elevation of a Chinese priest to the College of Cardinals in 1946 was a striking symbol of the Church's intention to advance the process of Sinicization.

Catholic cultural and educational activities have played an important role in the advance of the Church. Schools, colleges, and universities

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59. Jean Mosterleet, S. J., Les martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire de Mao Tse-tung contre L'Eglise du Christ, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

60. Ibid.

779 have, on the one hand, made it possible for the youth of Chinese Catholic families to have a complete modern education under Church auspices and control; on the other, the colleges and the universities, notably Fu-jen University in Peking, and Aurora University in Shanghai, have given the clergy a chance to win over non-Catholic youth enrolled as students. Catholic scientific and cultural research, such as that carried on at the famous Sikawei Observatory near Shanghai, make it clear that the Church and modern science are not in direct opposition to one another.

779 798 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised trouble to the Church. The exchange of envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; Bishop Paul Yu Pin was widely believed to have strong influence with Generalissimo Chiang; these and other signs of identification of the Church with the Nationalist Government boded ill for the Church when the government declined

779 798 in power. As the Communist power increased, the persecution of the Church, begun in Communist areas in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were 200 groups and thirty youth groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün. Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[63]

Communist policies and propaganda have made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played up, and nationalistic feelings against it

61. Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempete sur la Chine, Paris, 1953,

62. Monsterleet, p. 148.

63. Hsü , Hsin Chung-kuo Ti Tsung-chiao Ko-hsin Yün-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China] , Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13.

• 779 798 were aroused. Its role as property owner -- "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" -- was dramatized during the land reform period, and local ignorance and hatred turned against it.[64] Old and long-discredited accusations were made against Catholic charitable organizations: the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting, and selling Chinese children.[65] The war in Korea provided the occasion for an increasing number of accusations of espionage against Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea, with the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and espionage.[66]

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64. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nationwide land reform campaign.

65. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

66. Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

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798 In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churches were confiscated. Priests were "tried and imprisoned, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[67]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communit teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge. Apparently this organization has had only limited success. Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent of the clergy went over to the "reformed Church"; nearly all openly proclaimed their faith; some died as martyrs.[68]

From October 1952 -- the time of the "Peace Congress" in Peking -- there was less

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67. Ibid., p. 28.

68. Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author.

779 persecution of Catholics, although between Jan. 798 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364.[69]

779 By far the highest concentration of Catholic clergy in the North China Region has been Peking. Peking, like Shanghai, had over 200 priests; the entire province of Fukien had only 177.[70] The following table indicates the distribution of Catholics and Catholic centers in North China.[71]

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69. Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit., p. 189.

70. Monsterleet, p. 33.

71. Cf. Monsterleet, pp. 16-17, for distribution of Catholic centers. The figures are from Annuaire des missions Catholiques de Chine 1939, Shanghai, 1939.

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Province	Total Population (Million)	Total Catholics	Metropolitan Bishoprics	Suffragan Dioceses
Hopei	31	789,873	Peking	Hsü'an-hua Yung-p'ing Tientsin Paoting An-kuo Cheng-ting Hsien-hsien Cho-hsien Hsing-t'ai (Shun-te) Yung-nien
Shansi	11	126,199	Taiyuan	Ta-t'ung Shuo-hsien Fen-yang Lu-an (Ch'ang-chih) Yü-tz'u

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Peking has been for many centuries the center of Catholicism in North China. Unfortunately we have little detailed information on the Communists' moves against the Catholics in Peking. The general course of events in the north followed the nationwide pattern outlined above. The Communists' campaign in 1950 for the "three autonomies" and for a "reformed church" met with disciplined Catholic resistance, although there were some defectors.[72] The Legion of Mary was dissolved by the government in Tientsin on July 13, 1951, and the dissolution was then carried out throughout the country. The Fu-jen Catholic University of Peking was confiscated in October 1950, and the Jesuit Tsinkou (Chin-ku) University in Tientsin was taken over in July 1951. In September 1951, the Communists assumed control of all Catholic primary schools (4,000 throughout the country), seminaries, hospitals, and orphanages.[73] Imprisonment, torture, and expulsion of foreign clergy proceeded steadily throughout these years. In late 1952 the persecution was eased.

While many missionaries predict that under sustained persecution the Church hierarchy and organization will disappear in China, some expect that Catholics will find clandestine ways to preserve their faith. One former superior of a mission in Hopei predicts that in North China,

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72. Monsterleet, pp. 86-102, passim.
73. Monsterleet, pp. 134-5, 149.

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798 where Catholicism is deeply rooted and served by a larger native clergy, it will find means of survival. He points to the numerous all-Catholic villages and believes that Catholics will have a better chance to preserve their faith in the countryside where, he thinks, the influence of the Communist dominated schools may be less strong than in the cities.[74]

Yet the spreading network of state and party organizations, the cadres in every village and hamlet in China, means that Catholics everywhere will face further trials. How can the Church resist a totalitarian state and gain converts when conversion brings political and social sanctions against them? Father Greene, who witnessed the persecution in Kwangai, sounds a sombre note of warning. He is speaking of the cadres.

> "It was impossible for me, as I watched these well-trained youths perform their inhuman tasks, to minimize the seriousness of their convictions and the thoroughness of their methods. These convictions were deeply impressed on their minds... The new ideas and strange thoughts are unconditionally accepted by the young, and accepted with a fanaticism which fears neither suffering, hardship nor death. I saw shy youths changed into courageous

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74. Monsterleet, p. 214. The commentator is not named.

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798 apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youths break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause."[75]

The basic question is whether the harassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it can not, its future throughout China is dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

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797 In many respects the Prostestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhism and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by wide-spread, diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their powers to replace that order with a Christ-

75. Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

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797 ian democratic society. And they failed also to forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

Protestant missions began in the ports of the China coast that were gradually opened up after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic -- from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval

Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations

779 of Christianity to the Chinese.[76] Naturally the
797 antagonism between Catholic and Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[77]

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76. There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena, "Les missions Protestantes en Chine," Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore, Series III, Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damboriena; Creighton Lacy, "The Missionary Exodus from China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec. 1955, p. 305, observes: "Far more disruptive in almost every mission area has been the swarm of small, independent sects -- pentecostal, holiness, fundamentalist -- most of them divisive. Not only do they assert their unwillingness to co-operate with other Christian groups, but they seek most of their converts from the established churches."

77. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, pp. 158-64.

• 779 797 Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied: "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries.[78] Chinese governments, imperial and nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and in the twenties and thirties there were serious efforts to curb them. One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor results after ninety years of effort, was to reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions[79] fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4,000,000 in 1935 and 1936. This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared

78. Ibid., p. 159.
79. Damboriena, p. 83.

• 779 with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers
797 the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism in thought.

The Sino-Janpanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north central China. At the war's end, the Protestant missionaries returned and set about the rehabilitation of church establishments. Apparently progress was made, but there were disquieting aspects. The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

> "The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yielded to colleagues returning from the West."[80]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and

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80. Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clearheaded of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

The timetable of Communist moves against Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the confiscation of church property, church schools and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. There was a gradual decrease in the number of Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[81] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have been forced to accept the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectariansim, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The " three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has

81. The first figure is from the Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Dam boriena, p. 82. The other figures are from Walker, op. cit., p. 19.

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been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851, and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this as a praise-worthy end.[82] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) a "grand union of the churches;" (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[83] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[84] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the

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82. Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

83. Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1050, p. 3.

84. Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

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case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future of China is dark indeed.

The North China Region had the following distribution of Protestants.[85]

Province	Population (Million) (1938)	Percentage of Protestants (1938)	Number of Protestants (1924)
Hopei	31.1	6.4	22,283
Shansi	12.0	2.4	8,340

The tendency for Protestantism to have its greatest strength in the accessible coastal provinces has persisted until today. In terms of social composition, the Protestant community has been estimated as 75 per cent rural and 25 per cent urban, with farmers predominating and a lesser number of petty merchants and workers.[86]

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85. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, XI, 1938, pp. 272-81. Tables reproduced in Damboriena, pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from the China Yearbook, 1924. Ku's percentages seem unduly high in relation to the total known communicants.

86. Percentage estimates by the Dean of the University of Nanking as of the early 1930's. Damboriena, p. 30.

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668 Peking has been second only to Shanghai as a center of Protestant religious and educational work. Here were two of the most impressive institutions which the Protestants had built: Peking Union Medical College and Yenching University. Here too were important missionary centers, hospitals, and institutes for social work. The major institutions have been taken over by the Communist state, but it would appear that churches are still holding regular services. We have no direct reports on Peking, but a Chinese Protestant alleged that some 140 Protestant churches in Shanghai were holding services every Sunday.[87] The same source makes much of the fact that the Chinese Protestant sects are taking over their own missionary activities -- one of the "three autonomies." He further states that nearly 200 students have been enrolled in divinity schools in both Nanking and Peking.[88]

The future of Protestantism is uncertain. The key to its survival is whether, within the strict limits imposed by the new Communist-Nationalist orthodoxy, a Christian church can

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87. Yao-tsung Wu, "Freedom of Religious Belief in a Prosperous and Strong Fatherland," Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1955; SCMP, 1159, Oct. 28, 1955, p. 41. A high level of church attendance in Shanghai is confirmed by accounts of British evacuees. Cf. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

88. Wu, loc. cit.

779 668 win over a significant number of the youth. Christianity is continually castigated in education and in the press as backward, superstitious and unscientific. The rewards of place and prestige go to those Chinese most fervent in their acceptance of the Communisty orthodoxy. It is doubtful if a significant number of youth will act to cut themselves off from these rewards by embracing an alien religion.

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Two studies were made of the temples. The first and more complete study was made in 1928 of the temples in the 62 villages of the Experimental District. A more general study of the entire hsien was made in 1930. There were 855 temples in the 453 villages and market towns of the hsien, an average of 1.9 temples per village. Tinghsien city had 22 temples. For the Experimental District, the figure was 104 temples, an average of 1.7 temples per village. Some villages had no temples. Others had as many as 11. In the Experimental District 31, or one-half of the villages, had no temples; eight had only one temple. Eleven villages, 18 per cent, had more than three temples, but only four villages, 6 per cent, had more than five temples.

There were three Mohammedan mosques in the hsien, two in the villages and one in the city.

The Catholics had a large city church, six village churches, and 36 other places of meeting, the Protestants a city church, 14 village congregations, but no village churches.

The list of the principal gods in the temples showed that there were four kinds or groups of temples, Buddhist, Taoist, Official, and Individual.

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The outstanding deities of the different cults are, of course, quite clear. The various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and Kuan Yin, the goddess of mercy, are unmistakably Buddhist. Yü Huang, the San Ching, the San Kuan, Chen Wu, Erh Lang, Lao Tzu, and the Stellar Deities are the chief Taoist gods. The Niang Niangs, a group of some nine goddesses, are included in this group even though their origin is probably pre-Taoist and may trace back to a very early goddess of fecundity. National heroes who have gradually been deified and given a place in the Official temples are Confucius; China's three mythical emperors, Fu Hsi, Shen Nung, and Huang Ti; the three heroes of San Kuo times, Kuan Yü, Liu Pei, and Chang Fei; and Yüeh Fei, a Sung dynasty warrior. Besides these heroes the Official list includes the Ch'eng Huang and the T'u Ti, the gods of the particular locality. Ch'eng Huang, the protector of the city, had the same rank in the spirit world as the local official had in the temporal world. The T'u Ti is the local constable. The dragons are included in the official list as they controlled the rain, and it was part of the officials' duty to offer prayers for propitious weather.

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776 794 Another group of gods who are neither Buddhist, Taoist, nor Official can best be classified as the gods of individual cults. They are generally polytheistic in nature. Such gods are the Ch'ung Wang, god of the insects, Ma Wang, god of the horses, Ho Shen, god of the river, and others of a similar nature.

When a temple is classified as Buddhist, Taoist, Official, or as belonging to one of the individual cults, it means that the principal deity belongs to that group. The lesser gods of the temple may, and often do, belong to one of the other groups. The Buddhist Kuan Yin and the Official Kuan Ti are found on the side altars of many temples dedicated to other deities.

795 779 Through the years Buddhism, Taoism, and the Official and individual cults have influenced each other, borrowed from each other, and imitated each other as one or the other has gained in popularity, prestige, and power until now, in some cases, it is difficult to decide the group to which some of the temples belong.

Several examples will perhaps illustrate how the different groups have intermingled and influenced each other. The origin of the dragon is pre-Buddhist as it goes back to very early days, but it is the Buddhists who have personalized the dragons and the dragon mother. We have included the dragons in the Official list because of their official function in controlling the rain. The Ch'eng Huang has long been the official protector of the city walls, but under the Manchu dynasty the deceased official whose spirit was to occupy that position for three years was nominated by the Taoist pope. At the end of his term the Ch'eng Huang might be renominated or replaced. The Buddhists claim that Yü Huang, the chief god of the Taoist trinity, is their god Yü Ti, stolen by the Taoists. The head Taoist priest in Ting Hsien lived in the city Ch'eng Huang temple. There used to be one temple, T'ien Chen Szu, that combined Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Mohammedanism so that any sect could come there to worship.

The Buddhist and Taoist temples did not appear to have any close connection with a central organization or governing body as is true of religious sects in most Western countries. The temples seemed to be relatively independent units. Most of them had been erected by the people living in the village. The building was financed sometimes by popular subscription, sometimes from official village funds, occasionally by an individual who had acquired wealth and wanted to

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do something for his native village. When built, the temple was dedicated to the deity who offered the type of protection the people felt they needed or who personified the characteristics they honored and revered. Most of the temples were looked after by the village people. Priests were in attendance only for special services. These priests had had, of course, the official Buddhist or Taoist training.

It must also be remembered that generally most of the Chinese do not feel the exclusiveness about their religion that often is felt by those trained in the traditions of Western countries. They can believe in both Buddhist and Taoist teachings and can worship in any of the temples if the deities have the attributes they desire to worship or are able to give the sort of help they need. One writer says that this is due to the fact that a popular religion has developed that has borrowed from Buddhism, Taoism, and the Official cult but is distinct from them and must be regarded as a separate system.

If the 855 village temples are grouped according to the connection of the principal deity, there were 345 Taoist, 223 Official, 215 Buddhist, 54 belonging to individual cults, and 18 that must be classed as miscellaneous as they were dedicated to all the gods or else their name, such as Big Temple, did not indicate their connection. The percentage division was 41 per cent Taoist, 26 per cent Official, 25 per cent Buddhist, 6 per cent Individual, and 2 per cent miscellaneous. In the Experimental District the division was very similar—45 per cent Taoist, 24 per cent Official, 23 per cent Buddhist, and 8 per cent Individual.

The principal Taoist deities, judging from the number of temples dedicated to them, were the Wu Tao, gods of the five elements, with 157 temples; the San Kuan, the three rulers of heaven, earth, and water; the Niang Niangs, a group of female deities who grant children, protect the eyes, etc.; Chen Wu, who alone among men is perfection itself; Yü Huang, the Jade or Pearly Emperor, the supreme god of the Taoist pantheon. Forty-five per cent of the Taoist temples were Wu Tao Miao; 91 per cent were dedicated to the above five groups of deities.

Kuan Yü, the Chinese god of war and also one of the gods of literature, was by far the most popular of the Official gods. He was the chief or one of the chief gods in 148, two-thirds, of the Official Temples. The dragons had 45 temples dedicated to them in Ting Hsien. These two groups included 86 per cent of the Official temples.

In 91 per cent of the Buddhist temples the chief deity was one of the

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776 manifestations of Kuan Yin, the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy. In some
779 temples she was known as the Nan Hai Ta Shih, South Sea Grand Goddess, in others as Lao Mu, old mother.

Three quarters of the individual cult temples were dedicated to the king of the horses or the king of the insects. The Huo Shen, fire god, did not have any temple in Ting Hsien, but was one of the secondary gods in some of the other temples.

346 In size the temples varied from one to 30 chien. There were 1,397 chien in the 855 temples, or an average of 1.6 chien per temple. For the Experimental District, 83 per cent of the temples had only one chien. Eleven per cent had three chien and only 3 per cent had more than three.

Three was the average number of temple chien per village for the entire hsien. For the six Districts the averages ranged from 2.2 in the 4th District to 3.4 in the 6th District. In the Experimental District the average was 2.8 chien per village. It has been difficult to find any reason for this difference in the averages. A difference in wealth might account for it, but the cost of erecting a one-chien temple was relatively small. The religious beliefs of the past may have made a deeper and more lasting impression on those living in the northern part of the hsien so that they built more and larger temples, or they may have been more conservative and so have preserved more of their temples. In the 4th District, there were many more villages where some of the people had been willing to accept the newer ideas presented by Christianity.

794 The operating expenses of a temple ordinarily were very small. Except for special services and occasional repairs only a few dollars a year would be needed for incense and paper money. Very few of the temples had any priest connected with them, so the support of a priest was seldom an item in the temple budget. One or more of the villagers was appointed to look after the temple and light the incense in front of the altar.

793 There were 24 Buddhist and 15 Taoist priests in Ting Hsien. Eight of the Buddhists and seven of the Taoists lived in the city. The others were in the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Districts. Twelve of the 15 Taoist priests were married. They belonged to a class that did not take the vow of celibacy.

Many of the priests were paid only when they took part in some special service, such as those held during a temple fair; during the temples'

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Hsien. In some areas he was known as the god of silk worms, but in Ting Hsien it was believed that he was responsible for the miraculous distribution of greatly needed buckwheat seed. The story is that some time ago when there was drought in Shen Chow Hsien and Yao Yang Hsien, the rain came just at the time for the sowing of buckwheat, but the people had no seed left. An old man appeared with a large supply of seed and sold it to the farmers. Instead of asking for money he said, "I know you have no money so I do not want any now. Give it to me after the harvest". He said his name was Han and his home Pei Ch'i in Ting Hsien. That year there was an unusually large buckwheat harvest and the farmers were very grateful to the old man who had sold them the seed. When, long after the harvest, he had not come for his money, the people met to discuss the matter. They finally collected the money that was due and delegated one of their number to take it to Pei Ch'i. He could find no family there with the surname of Han, only a small broken-down temple dedicated to Han Tsu. The people, consequently, believed that it was Han Tsu who gave them the buckwheat. Out of gratitude they rebuilt the temple and organized a temple fair that was held from the 21st to the 24th of the third moon. It was the largest of the temple fairs in Ting Hsien. People came to it from all the surrounding hsien as well as from many of the villages in Ting Hsien. The first day of the fair was a general holiday for the area.

Mohammedanism

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Mohammedanism has had a place in the religious life of Ting Hsien for more than three hundred years, possibly much longer, for Mohammedans came to Peking as residents during the Sung dynasty (960–1278). Mosques, Ch'ing Chen Szu, had been built in two villages and in the hsien city. The ahongs and their assistants carried on worship the usual five times a day. Meetings for members were held on Friday. All were required to bathe before attending service.

In the two villages with mosques there were 1,400 Mohammedans, 1,210 in one village and 190 in the other. Three other nearby villages had five Mohammedans each. The number of families represented was 255 or an average of 5.5 persons per family. In one village 72 per cent and in another 36 per cent of the families were Mohammedans. Food requirements and other customs are more conveniently observed if the adherents live fairly close together.

2:Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12

779 Undoubtedly there were some Mohammedans living in other villages throughout the hsien, but, except for those connected with the city mosque, their number was probably small. In the Experimental District, which includes the five villages mentioned above, 2.4 per cent of the families were Mohammedan. Corresponding figures for the entire hsien are not available as no attempt was made to determine religious affiliations throughout the hsien.

The elders of T'ang Chia Chuang, the village in which 72 per cent of the families were Mohammedan, told us that during the last 45 years there had not been any temple in their village. All the other villages of the Experimental District had had one or more temples even though one-half of the villages did not have any in 1928. Evidently the Mohammedans had been in the majority and in control of the affairs of T'ang Chia Chuang for many years.

Christianity

791 Christianity came to Ting Hsien from Ning Chin Hsien, where it had been preached by converts from the time of K'ang Hsi (1662–1723). The most prominent of these men had been officials in Peking, where they had been converted by the teaching of Catholic priests. During the years from 1820 to 1840 there was one village where the people were almost all Catholics. Many of the people of this village were killed in later persecutions. There were no Christian believers in that particular village in 1930, but the people did not worship the usual Chinese deities.

A French priest was resident in Ting Hsien in 1858 but had to leave because of the troubles that came soon thereafter. He was able to return soon after 1860, as a priest had acted as interpreter for Prince Kung in the negotiations that ended the war with France and England. The Prince persuaded the Emperor to give orders that the Catholic priests might work in North China. It is reported that when the priest came back to Ting Hsien, after 1860, there were only some 8,000 adherents in the 32 hsien included in the entire Cheng Ting area, of which Ting Hsien is a part. In 1930 the Catholic churches in Ting Hsien had some 5,800 members scattered in 58 villages and belonging to some 1,100 families. This was about 1.5 per cent of the population. In the city there were some 36 Catholic families with 130 persons. A French priest was in charge of the large church in the city. There were also one Chinese priest, three assistants, and one Chinese nun. The church

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

One evident reason for the stopping of the plays is an economic one. Such ceremonies are costly and cannot be kept up during "bad business," as the Cloth Pasters report. In the case of the Clock Stores, the probable reason for discontinuing the worship was that originally the guild ceremonies were of a Roman Catholic nature, the guildsmen all being of that religion, but recently many Buddhists have been taken into the trade and there could be no form of religious ceremony that would satisfy both groups. Undoubtedly contact with new ideas and loss in belief in the potency of the ancient religious worship have also been factors influencing this discontinuance. In the commercial guilds where all members are able to read and where wide contacts are made through the Chamber of Commerce, the newer ideas have a fairly direct access to the minds of the guildsmen.

C. The Names and Description of the Guild Founders or Masters

The guild founders or masters [1] were chosen from craftsmen, mythological or otherwise, who were supposed to have founded a particular craft, from emperors, historical or legendary, and from the gods of current belief. Table XVI [2] lists the masters or gods worshiped by the Peking crafts.

The most popular of these masters is the God of Wealth, who is worshiped by eight guilds. *Kung Shu Lu Pan,* whom we have already described in our study of the Carpenters,[3] is a close second, being worshiped by seven of the craft guilds. The legends and stories about these supposed foun-

[1] The special objects of guild worship were called masters, founders, gods or patron saints, the terms sometimes being used interchangeably.

[2] *Cf.* pp. 188, 189.

[3] *Cf.* p. 100.

771 Here the so-called Buddhists still hold the first place, with a percentage almost the same as that in calculating the distribntion by families. The table does not tell us much, except as it points to the significance of the Mohammedans who form 10% of the whole population over 16 years, and therefore, play a big part in the life of the town.

2. The Mohammedan Temple.

779 The religious life of the Mohammedans is centred in the Mohammedan Temple situated on the north side of the river. Originally it was on the south side, but in 1899 the Mohammedans contributed towards the new building on the present site.

779 793 Two officers are in charge of the Temple, the ahung or pastor, and the butcher. The ahung is selected every third year, and is eligible for re-election. He is the leader of all religious ceremonies both inside the Temple or in the families, and teaches the children the Turkish language and the Mohammedan bible. The butcher holds a permanent position, and is a person proficient in the killing of of livestock, who takes charge of all the killing for the members. In addition to these two regular officers there are three elders and a number of assistants who are all voluntary workers. The elders deal with finance matters and other important business, and the assistants help the elders in the administrative side of the work. The voluntary workers are elected from among the members, and their term of office is indefinite, depending upon the ability and aptitude of the individual. The elders are responsible for

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6:Young et. al. E-5 (1928-1929) 1930 AF12 North China AF12

selecting a suitable person from some other larger Temple for the position of ahung. 779 794

On Friday afternoon of every week a religious service is held, at which no woman is permitted to attend. There are no idols in the Temple, no music is used and absolute quietness is required from everyone except during the reading of the Koran. Before the service everyone must bathe, first washing the head and hands, then the body, and lastly the feet. There are certain public festivals to which women are admitted. On the twenty seventh day of the first month of the Chinese calendar every Mohammedan watches for the whole night as the Chinese do on New Year's Eve. Then there is the general meeting in memory of Mohammed at which everyone is present, and another meeting of the women and children who study the in the Temple in memory of the daughter of Mohammed. The Festivals are grand occasions for the members and great preparations are made and they are largely attended. The funeral servies are in charge of the ahung with the help of the elders. 779 796

The Temple is not only the centre for religious ceremonies, but also to a large extent a centre of the social life of the Mohammedan community. The elders not only help the ahung in the conducting of the services, but also look after the material welfare of the members, and there is very little poverty. The moral standard of the Mohammedans is very high and strictly adhered to by the members. It is the social unity of a community which makes the common life of the members possible, but the social unity of the 779 794

Mohammedans is not of the best kind which is based on willingness and consciousness. It is a unity which is forced upon the younger generation by the older, and is reponsible for the lack of progress and adjustment of the Mohammedans to the changes of social life.

The members contribute liberally towards the upkeep of the Temple and its services. Outside of the small income of about $110 derived from house rent and land all the expenses are defrayed by the voluntary contributions of the members. Some contribute money, others food, fuel, or oil, and some give their labour. And if there is at any time a call for money or material the members will contribute according to the need.

3. The Christian Church

The finest building in the town is the Presbyterian Church situated in the centre of the main street. The Presbyterians have been active in Ching Ho for some years, and in 1926 the new building was erected with the interest and the help of the local leaders. Unfortunately the church has not been very successful and although about ten families and about thirty students from the military academy attended the Sunday services and Bible classes in the past, only three families now profess Christianity.

The Church has made a larger contribution in the field of education. As it is rather for the younger children to walk to the school at the north end of the town, the Church opened two primary schools, one for boys and one for girls, and an attendance of

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100 was steadily maintained. 797

About 1925 a new pastor replaced the old one who had been so succesful in gaining the confidence of the townspeople. The new man was not so successful and at same time Presbyterian Churches adopted a policy of self-help for their rural churches. The people as a whole are very poor, and were not sufficiently interested to give the necessary help, so the church gradually closed down its services and school.

4. Chinese Temples

There are altogether ten temples in the town, five 795
in the northern section, and five in the southern. All of the them are inactive, and there is only one monk who lives in a small room, and watches one of the temples. The large number of temples, and their rich ornament, now decaying, give us an idea of their power and prestige in the past history of China.

At present the two largest temples are being 346
utilised by the school and the self-government associa- 178
tion. In most cases in China it will be found that the temples are the only public buildings which are available to serve the needs of the institutions necessary for the life of the town, and everywhere one finds old temples which in the past had tremendous power in the lives of the people, being used to house schools and public offices. Then we see the decay of 779
the temples and the lack of interest on the part of the 178
people it seems as if Buddhism is tottering, and that left to itself it will gradually die as a power in the peoples' lives, but the drastic measures taken by the

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779 178 government and the Party organisations to destroy idols and superstitution, has had its reaction, and in many places more interest is again being taken in the Buddhist teachings by uneducated people.